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Between 2000 and 2009, the Gini coefficient declined in 13 of 17 Latin American 
countries for which comparable data exist. The decline was statistically significant and 
robust to changes in the time interval, inequality measures and data sources.  In depth 
country studies for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru suggest that there are two 
phenomena which underlie this trend:  (i) a fall in the premium to skilled labor (as 
measured by returns to education); and (ii) higher and more progressive government 
transfers. The fall in the premium to skills results from a combination of supply and 
demand factors and, in Argentina—and to a lesser extent in Brazil--, from more active 
labor market policies as well. 
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Introduction  
 
Inequality is a distinctive feature of Latin America due to its high level and persistence (Figure 
1).
3  However, after rising in the 1990s, income inequality in the region has declined while it has 
increased in other parts of the world (Figure 2).
4 For the region as a whole, the Gini coefficient 
declined from an average of 0.529 in 2000 to 50.9 in 2009. Of the 17 countries for which 
comparable data exist, 13 experienced a decline in their Gini coefficient during this period. 
(Figure 3)  This widespread decline in inequality is remarkable. Inequality in Latin America is the 
result of state-capture on the part of predatory elites, capital market imperfections, inequality of 
opportunities (in particular, in terms of access to good quality education), labor market 
segmentation, and discrimination against women and non-whites.
5
  Is the decline in inequality significant? Is it robust? Are there common factors that 
explain it? What was the role played by labor markets and social expenditures? After analyzing 
the evolution of inequality in Latin America, this paper summarizes the findings of the UNDP-
sponsored project “Markets, the State and the Dynamics of Inequality in Latin America.” for 
Argentina (urban),
 Hence, the observed fall in 
inequality is good news both in terms of fairness and efficiency.  
6 Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, a representative sample of Latin America’s diversity 
in terms of initial inequality and economic growth.
7
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the evolution of inequality for 
Latin America. Section 2 includes detailed country narratives that delve into the determinants of 
inequality changes. A synthesis of the main findings is presented in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes. 
 The analysis suggests that the decline in 
inequality is robust to the selection of the time interval, inequality measure and data source. It 
also suggests that there are two phenomena underlying this new trend that are present in the four 
countries: (i) a fall in the premium to skilled labor and (ii) higher and more progressive 
government transfers.  
  
1.  The Evolution of Inequality in Latin America 
 
                                                 
3 In the mid-2000s, with a Gini coefficient of .53, Latin America was 18 percent more unequal than Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 36 percent more unequal than East Asia and the Pacific and 65 percent more unequal than advanced 
countries. Ferreira and Ravallion (2009). 
4 Also see Gasparini et al. (2008). 
5 See, for example, Atal et al. (2009); Barros et al. (2009a); Levy and Walton (2009); De Ferranti et al. (2004). 
6 Household surveys in Argentina cover urban areas only and represent about two thirds of the population. 
7 The four countries analyzed in this paper can be considered a representative sample (not in the statistical sense, but 
in terms of their characteristics) of middle-income countries in Latin America. It includes countries that experienced 
relatively high growth rates (Argentina and Peru) and countries where growth was modest (Brazil and Mexico); one 
of the most unequal countries in Latin America (Brazil); a traditionally low-inequality country, which witnessed the 
largest increase in inequality in the region over the past three decades (Argentina); three of the largest countries, in 
terms of population and GDP (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico); two countries where innovative, large-scale 
conditional cash transfers have been implemented (Brazil and Mexico); one of the countries with a large indigenous 
population (Peru); one country with a universalistic social policy (Argentina) and two countries with a dualistic social 
policy (Brazil and Mexico); and, finally, one country governed by the populist left (Argentina), one country governed 
by the social democratic left (Brazil), and two countries governed by non-leftist regimes (Mexico and Peru). In spite 
of such heterogeneity, we will see how these four countries share some common features in terms of what factors 
determined the decline in inequality. 
   3 
Latin America was already a region of sharp income inequality before the debt crisis and 
structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s when inequality rose in most countries.
 Around 2000, 
the rising trend in inequality came to a halt (Figure 2). Since then, and based on the SEDLAC’s 
data,
8 the Gini coefficient has declined in 13 out of 17 countries for which comparable data are 
available (Figure 3). The decline in inequality has been widespread. Inequality has fallen in high 
inequality Brazil and low (by Latin American standards) inequality Argentina and Venezuela; 
countries with a large share of indigenous population (Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru) and countries 
with a low share (Argentina); countries governed by the left (Brazil and Chile) and countries 
governed by non-leftist regimes (Mexico and Peru); countries with a universalistic social policy 
(Argentina and Chile) and countries with a traditionally exclusionary state (Bolivia and El 
Salvador). It has declined in countries recovering from crises in the early 2000s (Argentina and 
Venezuela) and, during the global recession in 2009, inequality continued on its downward trend 
in eight of the countries for which data exist (and it rose in three). Notably, inequality has 
declined both in fast growing countries (Chile and Peru) and slow growing ones (Brazil and 
Mexico).  In fact, the longest periods for which the decline could be documented correspond to 
Brazil and Mexico, two countries whose growth rates were rather slow in comparison.
9
The order of magnitude of the decline is non-trivial and, in the majority of cases, it is 
statistically significant. In country after country, the decline was at least equal to or higher than 
the increase in inequality in the preceding period (Figure 5). Of the 13 countries, the decline was 
not statistically significant in only two: Bolivia and Honduras (Figure 3).
 (Figure 4) 
10 Furthermore, the 
results are robust to the selection of the time period,
11 inequality measure (Gini, Theil and 90/10 
ratio, for example) and data source (SEDLAC or UNECLAC).
12  Changing the end years, using a 
different inequality measure, or UNECLAC as a source changes the ranking of countries and the 
total number that experienced a decline may be 12 instead of 13. However, the main conclusion 




   
2.  The Determinants of the Decline in Inequality:  Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru 
 
Factors that cause the distribution of income to change can be broadly classified into four 
categories: changes in the underlying distribution of assets and personal characteristics; changes 
in their returns; changes in the intensity of use of assets and labor market participation; and, 
changes in unearned income, including private and public transfers. At the household level, 
                                                 
8 The Socio-economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean or SEDLAC is a joint project of CEDLAS (at 
Universidad de La Plata, Argentina) and The World Bank.  The version of SEDLAC used in this paper is March 
2011 (http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/) 
9 Brazil’s per capita GDP for the period 1998-2009 was equal to 1.9 percent per year; Mexico’s was 2.5 percent per 
year for the period 1996-2008, the last year for which data on inequality was available. 
10 Using the bootstrap method, the changes were found to be significant at a 95 percent level and with 100 
replications. 
11 Although the order of the countries changes, the result is robust if we change the end years by one year or use a 
three-year average for the end points. The number of the countries with declining inequality may fall from 13 to 12 
when end points are changed. 
12 UNECLAC stands for United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.  See, for 
example, Barcena et al. (2010).  
13 The “robustness tests” are available from the authors.   4 
changes in the distribution of income will also be affected by changes in assortative matching, 
demographics (e.g., fertility and life expectancy) and consumption patterns.  State action can 
modify the distribution of income  through two main channels: directly, through fiscal or 
budgetary interventions (taxes and transfers) that change disposable income and purchasing 
power (through, for example,  indirect taxes and subsidies);
14
Which of these factors, and to what extent, were behind the observed decline in inequality in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru? In the four countries, the decline was substantial, statistically 
significant, there was Lorenz dominance and results were robust with respect to the choice of 
income variable (monetary or total income; before and after net transfers) and inequality measure 
(Gini and entropy measures).  
  and,  indirectly, through 
interventions that affect the determinants of market or primary income.  Government actions 
through direct and indirect interventions can affect the level and distribution of assets, returns to 
those assets, and post-fiscal (after taxes and transfers) incomes.  
Argentina
15
Urban Argentina experienced a sharp increase in inequality from 1990 until the beginning of 
2000, and a decline in inequality in the aftermath of the 2001/02 macroeconomic crisis (Figure 
5). This period covers two very different, almost opposite, economic policy regimes. In the 
1990s, Argentina went through far reaching market-oriented reforms in a context of weak labor 
market institutions and limited social protection. In the 2000s, state intervention in the economy 
became more pervasive, labor market institutions were stronger and social protection schemes 
redistributed income to unskilled and semi-skilled workers.  
  
Between 1991 and 2002, the Gini coefficient increased from 0.4652 to. 0.5326. During the 
1990s a factor behind the increase in inequality was the increase in the steepness of returns to 
education: the wage gap between skilled and low-skilled workers rose.  As in other Latin 
American countries, the increase in the skill premium was associated with the modernization of 
production and organizational structures.  This skill-biased technical change, in turn, was 
associated with Argentina’s trade and investment liberalization. Another factor behind the rise in 
earnings inequality was the weakening of labor unions. There is evidence that labor union 
membership and activity diminished significantly from 1991 to 2001. The decline in union 
activity coincided with reforms such as the privatizations, trade liberalization and price 
stabilization of the 1990s, which reduced the power of unions through the dissipation of rents 
from state-owned enterprises, protective tariffs and inflation-induced rents. The decline in union 
activity during the 1990s, unsurprisingly, coincided with a period of rising wage inequality.   
Following the 2002 crisis, the Gini coefficient fell from 0.5326 in 2002 to 0.4486 in 2009. 
During this period, both labor income (earned) and non-labor income (unearned) income 
inequality declined. A decomposition of the change in the Gini finds that 67 percent of the total 
decline in household per capita income inequality can be accounted for by the reduction in labor 
income inequality.
16
                                                 
14. Fiscal interventions also include general and targeted indirect subsidies and indirect taxes that affect the 
purchasing power of disposable income. 
 The fall in labor income inequality can be accounted for by the expansion of 
15 Based on Gasparini and Cruces (2010). 
16 Alejo et al. (2009). In essence, the method consists of decomposing the change in an inequality measure into the 
contributions from changes in the distribution of the proximate determinants, taken one at a time, plus the 
contributions from changes in the interaction (correlation) of proximate determinants with each other. The 
contributions are estimated through a series of sequential counterfactual simulations that assume that the   5 
employment generated by the fast economic recovery, the shift in favor of more low-skilled 
labor-intensive sectors as a result of the devaluation of the Argentine peso, the fading out of the 
effect of skill-biased technical change in the 1990s, and the rise in the influence of labor unions. 
All these factors caused the skill premium to fall (Figure 6).  This period was characterized by 
unprecedentedly high per capita GDP growth (of 8 percent a year since 2003 (except for the 
global crisis year of 2009)) and a sharp fall in the unemployment rate: from over 20 percent to 8 
percent.
17
The decline in non-labor income inequality can be linked to a more progressive fiscal policy. 
The large devaluation of the peso in 2002 had an indirect equalizing impact in terms of post-
fiscal income inequality. The devaluation initially had a negative impact on real wages and a 
positive effect on rents to land which was compounded by the substantial improvement in terms 
of trade resulting from the global commodity boom. However, the initially negative (and 
unequalizing) effect on real wages was in part compensated by the expansion of progressive 
export taxes which were used to finance large anti-poverty programs. Higher fiscal revenues were 
used to increase social spending. Social spending also became more progressive with the 
implementation of large cash transfer programs such as Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados in 2002 
(which reached 2 million households in 2003). The latter may be an important factor behind the 
equalizing contribution of the changes in the distribution of non-labor income. In addition, the 
excise taxes had an indirect redistributive impact because they kept domestic prices of traded 
goods below their international level; this was particularly important for food prices. Although 
the benefits of these policies leak to the non-poor and create inefficiencies, they are equalizing, at 
least in the short-term. 
 Although the devaluation initially had a negative impact on real wages, this effect faded 
as a cheaper peso stimulated output in labor-intensive sectors. By the early 2000s, the large-scale 
technological upgrading was probably coming to an end. Hence, the upward pressure on wages 
for skilled labor—an unequalizing force—subsided and the skill premium declined. A pro-union 
and pro-workers government raised minimum wages, mandated lumpsum increases in wages in 
the private sector and promoted collective bargaining. The revival of union activism coincided 
with a period of falling wage inequality after 2002.   
In sum, underlying the recent decline in inequality in Argentina are the petering out of the 
effect of technological upgrading coupled with strong labor-intensive growth.  Market forces 
have been complemented with state action. A pro-union and pro-disenfranchised government 
has been redistributing the windfall from very favorable terms of trade (associated with the 






Brazil is known for having one of the highest inequality in the world. There have been years 
when Brazil’s Gini coefficient was equal to 0.63, almost a historical and worldwide record. After 
rising in the 1970s and 1980s and a decade of almost no change in the 1990s, the Gini coefficient 
                                                                                                                                                        
distribution of the proximate determinant of interest remains the same as in the base year. For details on the 
methodology, see Barros et al. (2006 and 2007). 
17 It should be noted that although inequality fell substantially in relation to the crisis levels, it was not significantly 
different from its mid/late-1990s levels despite the fact that per capita GDP and employment were higher, labor 
institutions were stronger, and a massive cash transfer program had been implemented. 
18 Based on Barros, de Carvalho, Franco and Mendonça (2009b and 2010).   6 
declined steadily starting in 1998 and especially since 2002 (Figure 5). Between 1998 and 2009, 
Brazil’s Gini coefficient declined 5.4 percentage points from 0.5917 to 0.5374.
19
Like in Argentina and Mexico, the premium to skills (in effect, to higher education) rose in 
the 1990s and declined in the 2000s (Figure 6). In contrast to Argentina and Mexico, however, 
trade liberalization in the 1990s had not been associated with this phenomenon.
 During the 
period 2002-2009, the income of the bottom 10 percent grew at 7 percent per year (similar to 
China’s GDP per capita growth), nearly three times the national average (2.5 percent), while that 
of the richest 10 percent grew only at 1.1 percent a year. Two thirds of the decline in extreme 
poverty can be attributed to the reduction in inequality. For the same reduction in extreme 
poverty, Brazil’s overall per capita income would have needed to grow an extra 4 percentage 
points per year.  
20 In the 2000s, 
wage differentials between workers of different skills, living in different locations, and working in 
different sectors (formal/informal; primary/secondary) narrowed. Also during this period, the 
real minimum wage increased and public transfers rose (both in terms of average benefit and 
coverage).
21
A decomposition of the changes in the Gini coefficient in the 2000s suggests that changes in 
the distribution of household labor income per adult accounted for 31 to 46 percent of the 
decline in inequality,
   
22
The fall in inequality in the distribution of labor income per working adult is determined, 
among other things, by the quantity and the price effect of changes in the distribution of 
schooling. The 1990s was marked by an accelerated expansion of basic education in Brazil. The 
Gini coefficient for education declined from 0.4792 in 1990 to 0.3487 in 2009 (Figure 7). This 
changed the composition of the labor force by educational level with low-skilled and unskilled 
workers becoming relatively less abundant (Figure 6). Everything else equal, the latter should 
have pushed down earning differentials by education level (i.e., the skill premium); in fact, 
relative returns to education, particularly for secondary and higher education (vis-à-vis workers 
without schooling or incomplete primary) fell (Figure 6). Decomposition results suggest that half 
of the decline in labor earnings inequality (and almost 30 percent of the decline in household per 
capita income inequality) was explained by the combined effect of a fall in the inequality of 
education and a fall in the steepness of returns to education. The latter—the price effect-- was 
the predominant factor, accounting for 35 percent of the decline in labor earnings inequality (23 
percent for household income), while the former—the quantity effect-- accounted for 11 percent 
of the decline in labor earnings inequality (3 percent for household income).
 due to a significant growth in average labor income per working adult and 
to a moderate decline in its inequality. In contrast to Argentina, the contribution of changes in 
employment was rather limited; workers from relatively poor households were not among those 
that benefited the most from job creation during this period.   
23
                                                 
19 The decline in income inequality in Brazil fulfills the Lorenz dominance test and is statistically significant at 1 
percent confidence level. During the period 2004–2007, however, the Lorenz curves cross so the fall in inequality is 
not unambiguous. The growth rate in income for the bottom 5 percent was below the overall average for all 
percentiles and less than half of the growth rate corresponding to the second quintile. (Barros et al., 2010). 
  
20 Ferreira et al. (2007) find that “Unlike in other Latin American countries, trade liberalization appears to have 
made a significant contribution towards a reduction in wage inequality.” (Abstract) 
21 The minimum wage affects not only labor earnings but also unearned incomes of recipients of government 
transfers because some key benefits –for example, pensions- are change with the minimum wage. 
22 The figures depend on the inequality measure that is decomposed. 
23 Barros et al. (2009 and 2010).   7 
The decline in labor earnings inequality is also accounted for by a reduction in spatial and 
sectoral labor market segmentation.  Wage differentials between similar workers in metropolitan 
areas and those in medium-sized and small municipalities declined and so did wage differentials 
between urban workers versus rural, and primary versus other sectors.
24
Decomposition analysis suggests that between 40 and 50 percent of the decline in income 
inequality – depending on the inequality measure – was due to changes in the distribution of 
household non-labor income per adult; the impact of non-labor income arose from both a fall in 
non-labor income inequality and an increase in the number of households receiving non-labor 
income. What are the determinants of the decline in non-labor income inequality? The 
contribution of changes in the distribution of income from assets (rents, interest and dividends) 
and private transfers was unequalizing but limited. Most of the impact of non-labor income on 
the reduction of overall income inequality was due to changes in the distribution of public 
transfers: changes in size, coverage and distribution of public transfers explain 49 percent of the 
total decline in inequality.
 This process seems to 
indicate that there have been equalizing forces in the labor markets arising from labor demand. It 
is not yet clear which factors explain this trend. Perhaps there has been a relatively higher 
expansion of some productive sectors in the Brazilian agricultural ‘hinterland’ as opposed to the 
metropolitan/industrial areas thereby increasing the demand for labor and pushing up wages in 
the smaller and medium-sized municipalities compared to the past.  
25
Public transfers represent over 80 percent of non-labor income and 29 percent of household 
income
  
26 and include pensions and other standard contributory social security benefits; the 
Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC, a transfer to the elderly and disabled), and the Bolsa 
Família.
27 Since 2001, the government has increased the average amount of all transfers and 
broadened the coverage of well-targeted programs such as Brazil’s signature conditional cash 
transfer program Bolsa Família (literally, scholarship for the family).  While contributory social 
security has the largest coverage – about 30 percent of the Brazilian population lives in 
households receiving contributory social security benefits – the largest expansion was in Bolsa 
Família, whose coverage increased by close to 10 percentage points between 2001 and 2007, 
reaching 17 percent of households.
28
According to the decomposition results, while social security benefits account for almost 30 
percent of the overall reduction in income inequality, the increasing coverage of non-
contributory benefits (like BPC and Bolsa Família) was also important.
 
29
                                                 
24 Care must be taken because there will be some double counting since education may increase inequality not just 
through the positive impact on productivity but also by channeling more educated workers to the better jobs in the 
formal sector of the economy. 
 Despite representing just 
a tiny fraction of total household income (0.5 percent each), changes in the BPC and Bolsa 
25 Alejo et al. (2009). For details on the methodology, see Barros et al. (2006 and 2007). 
26 This information is based on the surveys data. It does not include all government monetary transfers. The ratio is 
with respect to household income as reported in the survey and it is not necessarily equal to the ratio of all 
government transfers divided by household disposable income from the National Accounts.  
27 These two programs represent 1 percent of household income and 5 percent of the public transfers concept 
measured in the survey. Bolsa Família, on average, equals 5 percent of average social security benefits. 
28 The program distributes cash to poor families on condition that the children and adolescents must attend school 
and meet basic health care requirements. The program reaches 11 million households (more than 46 million people) 
and covers a large proportion of the country’s 50 million individuals living in poverty. On average, the income of the 
beneficiaries is raised by around 12 percent. Fiszbein et al. (2009). 
29 Barros et al. (2009 and 2010).   8 
Família explain about 10 percent of the decline in household income inequality each.
30
In sum, the recent decline in inequality in Brazil resulted from three main factors: (i) 
decreasing wage differentials by educational level and reductions in the inequality in education; 
(ii) increasing spatial and sectoral integration of labor markets, in particular among metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan areas; and (iii) larger and better targeted non-contributory government 
transfers. Raising the minimum wage played a role through (i) and (iii); in particular, because 
social security benefits are indexed to the minimum wage. The direct impact of demographic 
factors was not very significant. Changes in the dependency ratio, employment and 
unemployment among the poor were of relatively less importance.
 In the case 
of social security transfers, the equalizing effect occurred primarily through an increase in the 
amount of the average benefit. In the case of Bolsa Família, the predominant factor was the 





After a period of rising inequality in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, Mexico’s income 
inequality has declined (Figure 5). Between 1996 and 2008, Mexico’s Gini coefficient fell from 
0.5472 to 0.5052 or by 4.2 percentage points.
 
33
The decline in inequality coincided with the implementation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. It also coincided with a shift in government spending 
patterns. Since the early 1990s, public spending on education, health and nutrition has become 
more progressive. In 1997 the Mexican government launched the conditional cash transfer 
program Progresa (later called Oportunidades), a large-scale anti-poverty program which reached 
around five million poor households – around 14.8% of households in 2006.  
  The income of the bottom 20 percent grew more 
than twice as fast as the income of the top ten percent. Contrary to expectations, the faster 
growth of incomes at the bottom of the distribution happened during a period of lackluster 
aggregate economic growth. After the 1995 peso crisis, when GDP contracted by around 8 
percent, the economy quickly recovered. Between 1996 and 2000 Mexico’s per capita GDP grew 
at a rate of 4 percent per year. However, between 2000 and 2008, per capita GDP grew at 
around 1 percent per year. Mexico –like Brazil- experienced a period of slow, and perhaps 
paradoxically, pro-poor growth. 
Decomposition analysis suggests that the reduction in the inequality of labor income per 
working adult (labor earnings per worker from wages and from self-emplo.yment) was the most 
important contributor to the reduction in inequality.
34
                                                 
30 Note that this decomposition of inequality changes by income source is different from the prior decomposition 
by proximate factors so results cannot be combined. 
 In the 2000s, it accounted for 65.5 percent 
of the decline in household per capita income inequality. What caused the distribution of labor 
income per working adult to change from being an unequalizing factor in the early 1990s to an 
equalizing one thereafter? Hours worked changed very little. In fact, they fell slightly for the 
31 Demographics, however, can be an important indirect factor. The lower fertility rates of the past decade, for 
example, imply that the demand for primary education (or the costs of providing universal coverage of primary 
education to the whole population) are lower and decreasing, freeing fiscal resources for post-primary education and 
other areas of social spending. The rate at which the low-skilled labor supply grows, is lower too. For a discussion of 
these factors, see Ocampo and Vallejo (forthcoming). 
32 Based on Esquivel, Lustig and Scott (2010). 
33 This Gini coefficient was estimated using total household income per capita which includes monetary and non-
monetary sources (such as the imputed value for owner-occupied housing rent) and capital gains. 
34 For details on the methodology, see Barros et al. (2006 and 2007).   9 
bottom quintiles, an inequality-increasing change. It is the changes in the relative hourly wages 
what caused the switch. Starting in the mid-1990s, the premium to skills --measured by the gap 
between the wages of more educated workers and workers with little or no education-- fell 
systematically. Changes in the returns to education accounted for a significant share of the rise in 
household per capita income inequality between 1984 and 1994.
35
During this period, the reduction in wage inequality happened because workers with lower 
levels of education and/or fewer years of experience had the largest increases in their average 
wages.  Both demand- and supply-side factors must have contributed to the reduction in the 
premium to skills. The demand-side factors have been associated with the greater integration of 
production with the United States following NAFTA.  An examination of the changes in the 
composition of the labor force by education and experience and the corresponding relative 
wages suggests that the wage increases for low-skilled workers seem to be also correlated with a 
shift in the composition of labor supply by education and experience (Figure 6). The share of 
workers with less than lower secondary education (and more than 20 years of experience) 
declined from almost 55 percent of the workforce in 1989 to about one third by 2006. The 
reduction in the relative supply of workers with low levels of skills (measured by school 
attainment) might be associated with the increase in average years of schooling for the bottom 
two quintiles, which reduced schooling inequality considerably between 1994 and 2006 (Figure 
7). In turn, the latter may be due to changes in public spending on education in the 1990s which 
expanded basic education considerably.  
 During the period of declining 
inequality (mid 1990s to 2006) the opposite occurred; returns to education became an equalizing 
factor. The distribution of the stock of education in the labor force became more equal too. The 
combined effect of a fall in the returns to education and the decline in inequality in educational 
attainment was a reduction in labor income (per worker) inequality.  Both the price and quantity 
effects were equalizing. 
Public spending on education in the 1970s and 1980s was heavily biased towards higher 
education. This changed in the 1990s. The relative ratio of spending per student in tertiary versus 
primary education declined from a historical maximum of 12 in 1983–1988, to less than 6 in 
1994–2000.
36
While less prominently than in Brazil, the change in the inequality of non-labor income per 
adult was equalizing too and the decomposition of the Gini suggests that it accounted for around 
  It is worth mentioning that the reduction in such ratio could be driven by a 
reduction in tertiary education spending, with no changes in primary or secondary education 
expenditures, as actually happened in certain cases during the crisis of the 80s in the region. In 
this case, however, even though there was a reduction in tertiary education expenditures in real 
terms, there was a significant increase in resources devoted to primary and secondary levels. 
More resources on the supply-side and the implementation of demand-side subsidies for 
education through Progresa/Oportunidades, changed the incidence of public spending on education 
from being slightly regressive in 1992 to being progressive in 2006. Hence, the fall in the 
premium to skills can be linked to both market factors, which affected the demand for labor by 
skill, and state action in education spending.  In addition, due to the demographic transition, the 
cohorts entering primary school became smaller over time, liberating resources for secondary 
schooling. 
                                                 
35 Legovini et al. (2005). 
36 By comparison, the average ratio for high-income OECD countries is close to 2.   10 
15 percent of the decline. Within non labor income, a marginal increase in income from own 
businesses (profits), income from property (rents) and pensions was unequalizing, whereas that 
from remittances and transfers was equalizing, with the latter increasing its (equalizing) marginal 
contribution over time.
37
With the policy shift from general price subsidies to targeted programs and from tertiary to 
basic education, government spending became increasingly more progressive from the mid -
1990s onward. But there is lots of room for improvement: fiscal incidence analysis indicates that 
more than 10 percent of redistributive spending (social spending plus consumer subsidies and 
agricultural support) is allocated to programs that are regressive (that is, they make the pos-fiscal 
distribution of income more unequal than the distribution of market income).
 The equalizing contribution of transfers rose over time because their 
share in total income rose and their own inequality and Gini correlation with total monetary 
income fell. The share of transfers in total income rose because there was a significant expansion 
in coverage of public monetary transfers – in particular, through a subsidy program for 
agricultural production (Procampo) and Mexico’s signature conditional cash transfer program 
Progresa/Oportunidades. The lion’s share of the expansion in households receiving non-labor 
income was due to implementation of the Progresa/Oportunidades conditional cash transfer 
program in 1997. In fact, Procampo is not pro-poor/progressive in absolute terms (i.e., its 
concentration coefficient is positive); in contrast, Progresa/Oportunidades is an example of 
‘redistributive efficiency’. With as little as 0.36 percent of GDP and 4 percent of total 
redistributive spending, Progresa/Oportunidades accounts for 18 percent of the change in the 
pre/post-transfers difference in the Gini coefficient.  
38
As with Argentina and Brazil, the decline in inequality in post-NAFTA Mexico can be 
explained by two main factors.  First, the equalizing price (a fall in the premium to skills) and 
quantity effects of education. The decline in the skill premium, in turn, is the product of 
demand- and supply-side factors.  The latter reflect the large effort made by the government to 
expand basic education, including the launching of the conditional cash transfer program 





Between 1997 and 2009, Peru’s Gini coefficient fell from 0.5371 to 0.4908 or by 4.6 
percentage points, a change that was both statistically significant and satisfied Lorenz-dominance 
(Figure 5). In contrast to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the evolution of the Gini showed ups 
and downs instead of a steady decline. In Peru, as in Argentina and in contrast to Brazil and 
Mexico, the decline in inequality overlapped with a period of fairly rapid economic growth.   
  
Decomposing the change in the Gini coefficient for household per capita income indicates 
that changes in the distribution of non-labor income account for close to 90 percent of the 
decline in total inequality and that the changes in the distribution of labor income per worker 
were strongly unequalizing.
40
                                                 
37 The marginal contributions were estimated using the method proposed by Stark et al. (1986). 
 On the surface, then, it would seem that Peru’s story is very 
different from that of the other three countries.  However, on closer examination one can see 
38 Lustig et al. (2011). 
39 Based on Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010). 
40 Alejo et al. (2010).   11 
that it is not.  While the changes in the distribution of earnings per worker at the household level 
were unequalizing, the changes in earnings inequality for individual workers were equalizing.   
 A parametric decomposition of the changes in labor income inequality suggests that changes 
in the educational structure of the workforce (that is, the distribution of human capital) was 
equalizing.
 41 Changes in returns to education (Figure 6) had an equalizing effect at the individual 
worker’s level but were unequalizing at the household level. This suggests that the unequalizing 
effect of earnings at the household level is more related with assortative matching than with the 
dynamics of the labor market.  It is possible that with more women becoming highly educated, 
men marrying better educated and better paid women became more pervasive and/or that 
married better educated women increased their participation in the labor force more than other 
women.
42
In effect, during this period, the share of workers with secondary school education increased 
(Figure 6). This expansion of the educational attainment of the labor force is the result of 
policies and household decisions from decades. Between 1970 and 2000, school enrolment in 
basic education increased by 3 percent per year, a higher rate of growth than that of the 
population at normative schooling age, suggesting a catching-up process among children older 
than the normative age. Education inequality fell sharply (Figure 7). However, while enrolment 
rose, spending per pupil fell and a long-term deterioration of the quality of education reduced its 
equalizing power. Peruvian public schools, which are attended by children of the poor, tend to 
be of lower quality than private schools. Adjusting for differences in quality, “Peru’s education 
system is one of the most unequal in Latin America as measured by learning achievement on 
international tests.”
  The quantity (equalizing) effect of education can be traced back to the expansion in 
coverage of basic education starting in the 1990s.The price (equalizing) effect of education –that 
is, the decline in the premium to skills-- appears to be the result of the combined effect of the 
increase in supply of workers with more years of schooling and the fact that demand for skilled 
workers did not outpace supply. 
43
As mentioned above, the decline in inequality in Peru is accounted for primarily by the 
decline in non-labor income inequality.  Underlying the latter are changes in the size and 
distribution of government transfers, as it happened in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Over the 
last decade, per capita social spending increased by close to 50 percent and the proportion of 




                                                 
41 Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010) apply the methodology used in Bourguignon et al. (2005). This methodology differs 
from that used in the sections on Brazil and Mexico in that the former simulates the entire distribution while the 
latter decomposes a specific indicator (the Gini, Theil, etc.). It consists of simulating counterfactual distributions by 
changing one factor at a time and holding other aspects constant. Among its advantages, this methodology permits 
the identification of a factor’s contribution to inequality related to changes in either its distribution or its market 
returns. For example, it is possible to isolate the contribution of a change in the distribution of educational 
attainment (a proxy for human capital) from a change in the returns to education (e.g., the skill premium).  
 and public services, and more recently, in the form of monetary 
transfers with the launch of Peru’s conditional cash transfer program Juntos. Social spending 
incidence analysis reveals that the share of non-monetary transfers in household per capita 
income rose by 0.8 percentage points on average. For the poorest income decile, the increase 
was equal to 6.5 percentage points; for the second, third and fourth poorest deciles, the 
42 This very interesting question requires further research beyond the scope of this paper. 
43 Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010). 
44 These mainly include health services and food transfers.   12 
respective increases equaled 5.5, 4.3 and 2.6 percentage points, respectively. Changes in food 
transfers, in particular, accounted for the increase in the progressiveness of social spending. 
While transfers became more pro-poor, the changes at the other end of the distribution reveal 
that there are some problems in allocation priorities: while the share of non-monetary transfers 
in per capita household income fell for the 8
th and 9
th deciles it rose for the 10
th (although by less 
than the average).  
In sum, in Peru—like in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico-- there was also a decline in the 
premium to skills associated with the expansion of basic education and possible changes in the 
patterns of labor demand. However, this equalizing effect was more than offset by the 
unequalizing effect of a more concentrated distribution of labor income per worker at the 
household level. The causes for the rise in household labor income inequality remain to be 
investigated but changes in assortative matching and in the pattern of female labor force 
participation are the two leading candidates.  The expansion of government transfers targeted to 
the poor was a powerful equalizing force in Peru.   
 
3.  Main Findings: A Synthesis 
 
In the four countries, earnings and non-labor income inequality declined in the 2000s. 
Declines in earnings inequality appear to be associated with less steep  returns to higher 
education, which reduced earnings per worker inequality, and much less so--or not at all--to 
changes in employment patterns.
45 In contrast to the 1990s, the premium to skills fell. Supply 
and demand forces appear to have been at play. Especially in Brazil, Mexico and Peru there have 
been notable changes in the composition of labor supply. As a result of an expansion of basic 
education,
46
In addition to the equalizing impact of the price effect of educational upgrading, the latter 
was equalizing through its quantity effect particularly in Brazil, Mexico and Peru. The significant 
expansion of basic education, in turn, seems to be associated with conscious government efforts 
including administrations from earlier periods. Higher spending per student in basic education 
and an effort to make education accessible in rural areas eased supply-side constraints. In 
addition, the conditional cash transfer programs Bolsa Familia (Brazil) and Progresa/Oportunidades 
(Mexico) reduced demand-side constraints by compensating poor households for schooling costs 
and the opportunity cost of children’s labor.
 low-skilled labor has become relatively scarce and therefore can command relatively 
higher returns/wages. In Argentina, the reduction in the premium to skills appears to be related 
not just to the change in the composition of skills but also to the employment effects of a 
booming economy and the wage-compressing effects of active labor market policies from a pro-
union government. 
47
The reduction in labor earnings inequality—and of the skill premium in particular—
contrasts with what occurred in the previous decades. In the 1980s and, in particular, in the 
1990s returns to education rose. The evidence suggests this was caused by the opening up of the 
economies to international trade and foreign investment and the concomitant skilled-biased 
technical change.  The reduction of the returns to education in the late 1990s and the 2000s 
 
                                                 
45 Manacorda et al. (2010). 
46 Basic education goes from grades 1-9 in Argentina and Mexico; from 1-8 in Brazil; and, from 1-11 in Peru. The 
number of grades include what countries call as basic primary and secondary education.  
47 For more on Bolsa Familia and Oportunidades, see, for example Fiszbein et al. (2009).   13 
suggests that the unequalizing impact of the skilled-biased technical change might have run its 
course. As a consequence, labor market dynamics became increasingly affected by the changes in 
the composition of labor supply by schooling level. 
The reduction in the inequality of non-labor income was the second major factor behind 
the decline in inequality. Non-labor income includes quite disparate income sources: returns to 
capital (interests, profits and rents), private transfers (for example, remittances) and public 
transfers. The contribution of changes in returns to capital tended to be small and unequalizing.  
In terms of private transfers, remittances proved to be equalizing and became even more so in 
the 2000s, because they closed the gap between rural and urban household per capita incomes 
particularly in the case of Mexico. However, what was new in the 2000s was the significant rise in 
importance of the equalizing contribution of government transfers. Large-scale conditional cash 
transfers programs such as Bolsa Familia  (Brazil) and Progresa/Oportunidades  (Mexico)  had 
remarkable redistributive power. These programs are a small share of total government social 




 Concluding remarks 
 
During the first decade of this century, income inequality in most countries in Latin 
America has declined. The decline has been non-trivial, statistically significant and robust to 
changes in the time interval, inequality measure, definition of income and data source. Our in 
depth analyses for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru reveal two main underlying factors: a fall 
in the premium to skills and more  progressive government transfers. The fall in the skill 
premium seems to be associated with a push in the coverage of basic education which made low-
skilled labor relatively less abundant and changes in labor demand. Through both quantity and 
price effects, the expansion of education has been equalizing. The distribution of human capital 
became more equal and the gap in returns to schooling by level narrowed. Using Tinbergen’s 
language, in the race between education and technology, the former took the lead.  
The redistributive momentum may be hard to sustain, however. While educational 
attainment has become significantly more equal, the same cannot be said about the distribution 
of the quality of education. The experience of the United States should serve Latin America as a 
warning of what may be yet to come.
 49
 
 In the United States, earnings inequality rose significantly 
since the 1980s because the premium to skills increased.  Returns to skills went up because there 
was a slow-down in the rate at which workers with post secondary education came into the labor 
market (and to a lesser extent because of skill-biased technical change).  The low quality of 
education in preceding levels generated many high school graduates who were not “college 
ready” and, thus, educational upgrading stalled. Equity cannot be taken for granted. It requires 
“hard work” both from policymakers and the polity. 
 
                                                 
48 Beyond targeted transfers, government social spending became more progressive in the 2000s. Spending on 
health, education, nutrition and basic infrastructure (electricity and water and sanitation, for example) became more 
pro-poor. In spite of the observed progress, however, a large share of public spending is still neutral or regressive 
from the distributive point of view. In addition, taxes, in particular personal income taxes, are severely underutilized 
as an instrument of redistribution in a region characterized by having a substantial number of ultra-high net worth 
(i.e. super rich) individuals.   





Alejo, Javier, Marcelo Bergolo, Fedora Carbajal and Guillermo Cruces. 2009. “Cambios en la desigualdad 
del ingreso en América Latina. Contribución de sus principales determinantes (1995 – 2006)”, 
CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, prepared for the project Markets, the State and the 
Dynamics of Inequality, UNDP. 
 
Atal, Juan Pablo, Hugo Ñopo and Natalia Winder. 2009. “Gender and ethnic wage gaps in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. An extensive review of the literature and contemporary estimates 
for the region.” Draft. Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
Bárcena, Alicia, Antonio Prado and Martín Hopenhayn. May 2010. "Time for Equality: Closing gaps, 
opening trails." Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). 
 
Barros, Ricardo, Miguel Nathan Foguel, and Gabriel Ulyssea. 2006.  Desigualdade de Renda no Brasil: uma 
análise da queda recente, volume 1. Brasília: IPEA. 
 
Barros, Ricardo, Mirela de Carvalho, and Samuel Franco. 2007. “O papel das Transferências Públicas na 
Queda Recente da Desigualdade de Renda Brasileira.” In Desigualdade de Renda no Brasil: uma 
análise da queda recente, edited by Ricardo Paes de Barros, Miguel Nathan Foguel, and Gabriel 
Ulyssea, chapter 16, volume 2. Brasília: IPEA.    
 
Barros, Ricardo, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009a. 
Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean World Bank. Washington, DC: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Barros, Ricardo, Mirela de Carvalho, Samuel Franco, and Rosane Mendonça. 2009b. “Markets, the State 
and the Dynamics of Inequality: Brazil’s Case Study”, prepared for the project Markets, the State 
and the Dynamics of Inequality, UNDP. 
 
Barros, Ricardo, Mirela de Carvalho, Samuel Franco, and Rosane Mendonça. 2010. “Markets, the state 
and the dynamics of inequality in Brazil.” In Luis F. López Calva and Nora Lustig (eds.), Declining 
Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? Chapter 6. Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
and UNDP. 
 
Bourguignon, François, Francisco Ferreira, and Nora Lustig, eds. 2005. The Microeconomics of Income 
Distribution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin America. Washington, DC: The World Bank/Oxford 
University Press. 
 
De Ferranti, David, Guillermo Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. Inequality in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Breaking with History? Washington, D.C: World Bank.   15 
Esquivel, G., N. Lustig, and J. Scott. 2010. “A decade of falling inequality in Mexico: market forces or 
state action?” In Luis F. López Calva and Nora Lustig (eds.), Declining Inequality in Latin America: 
A Decade of Progress? Chapter 7. Washington DC: Brookings Institution and UNDP. 
 
Ferreira, Francisco H.G.and Martin Ravallion. 2008. “Global Poverty and Inequality:A Review of the 
Evidence.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4623, May. 
 
Ferreira, Francisco H.G., Phillippe G. Leite and Matthew Wai-Poi . 2010. “Trade Liberalization, 
Employment Flows and Wage Inequality in Brazil.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
4108, January. 
 
Fiszbein, Ariel and Norbert Schady with Francisco H.G. Ferreira, Margaret Grosh, Nial Kelleher, Pedro 
Olinto, and Emmanuel Skoufias. 2009. Conditional Cash Transfers. Reducing Present and Future Poverty. 
World Bank Policy Research Report. World Bank. 
 
Gasparini, Leonardo, Guillermo Cruces , Leopoldo Tornarolli and Mariana Marchionni. 2008. “A 
Turning Point? Recent Developments on Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean”. 
CEDLAS (Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales). La Plata, Argentina. 
 
Gasparini, Leonardo and Guillermo Cruces. 2010. “A distribution in motion: the case of Argentina.” In 
Luis F. López Calva and Nora Lustig (eds.), Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of 
Progress? Chapter 5. Washington DC: Brookings Institution and UNDP. 
 
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz. 2008. The Race between Education and Technology. Belknap Press de 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Jaramillo, M., and J. Saavedra. 2010. “Inequality in post-structural reform Peru: the role of market and 
policy forces.” In Luis F. López Calva and Nora Lustig (eds.), Declining Inequality in Latin America: 
A Decade of Progress? Chapter 8. Washington DC: Brookings Institution and UNDP. 
 
Legovini, Arianna, Cesar Bouillon, and Nora Lustig. 2005. “Can Education Explain Changes in Income 
Inequality in Mexico?” in F. Bourguignon, F. Ferreira and N. Lustig (eds.), The Microeconomics of 
Income Distribution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin America, Washington D.C.: World Bank and 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Levy, Santiago and Michael Walton, eds. 2009. No Growth without Equity? Inequality, Interests and Competition 
in Mexico. Palgrave Macmillan and the World Bank. 
 
Lustig, Nora, Carola Pesssino and John Scott (2011). “Commitment to Equity: An Assessment of Fiscal 
Policies in Argentina and Mexico.”  Commitment to Equity Project, Working Paper (in process), 
Tulane University. 
 
Manacorda, Marco, Carolina Sanchez- Paramo, and Norbert Schady. 2010. “Changes in Returns to 
Education in Latin America: The Role of Demand and Supply of Skills.” Industrial And Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, January.   16 
 
Ocampo, Jose Antonio and Juliana Vallejo “Economy and Equity in Latin America.” Journal of Human 
Development, forthcoming. 
 
OECD. 2010. Tackling Inequalities in Brazil, China, India and South Africa: The Role of Labour Market and 
Social Policies, OECD Publishing. 
 
Stark, Oded, J. Edward Taylor and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1986. “Remittances and Inequality.” Economic 
Journal 96, no. 383 (September): 722–740. 
 
   17 






































Gini Coefficient in Percent
  
Source: SEDLAC(CEDLAS and The World Bank), March 2011  
(http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/) 
 



















Early 90s                           
(12 countries)
Mid-90s                                      
(15 countries)
Late 90s                        
(16 countries)
Mid-2000s                              
(17 countries)
Late 2000s                       
(17 countries)
Average (a) Average (b)
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), 
March 2011  
(http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/) 
Note: Unweighted averages. (a) for all countries; (b) for countries in which inequality declined in 
the 2000s   18 
Figure 3 – Declining Inequality in Latin America by Country: 2000-2009 (annual % change in 
Gini)
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), March 2011  
(http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/) for Latin American countries; and OECD (2010) for China, India, South Africa  
and OECD-30.    
Note: Solid bars represent cases where changes are statistically significant based on SEDLAC’s estimates.  
Data for Argentina and Uruguay are for urban areas only. In Uruguay, urban areas covered by the survey represent  
80 percent of the total population; in Argentina, they represent 66 percent. The average change in the Gini for each country  
is calculated as the percentage change between the end year and the initial year divided by the number of years;  
the average for the total is the simple average of the changes by country (thirteen countries in which inequality fell).  
The years used to estimate the percentage change are as follows: Argentina (2009-00), Bolivia (2007-01),  
Brazil (2009-01), Chile (2009-00), Costa Rica (2009-01), Dominican Republic (2009-00), Ecuador (2009-03),  
El Salvador (2008-00), Guatemala (2006-00), Honduras (2009-01), Mexico (2008-00), Nicaragua (2005-01),  
Panama (2009-01), Paraguay (2009-02), Peru (2009-01), Uruguay (2009-00), and Venezuela (2006-00). Using the  
bootstrap method, with a 95 percent significance level, the changes were not found to be statistically significant  
for the following countries: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras (represented by grid bars in the figure).  
The years used in non-Latin American countries are as follows: China (1993-Mid 00s), India (1993-Mid 00s),  
South Africa (1993-08), and OECD-30 (Mid 80s-Mid 00s). 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 



























































Source: Authors’ based on data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), March 2011  
(http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/) 
Note: includes countries in which the decline in inequality has been sustained for several years.    19 
Figure 5 – The Rise and Fall in Inequality 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), 
March 2011  
(http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/)   20 
Figure 6 - Returns to Education and Composition of Labor Force by Schooling Level: 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru 
 
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), March 2011  
(http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/)   21 
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